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Introduction 
 
“Clinical medicine involves interacting with and 
understanding persons, and thus addresses a problem 
that is fundamentally different from and conceptually 
more complex than the kind of reasoning involved in 
problems such as mathematical calculation or measuring 
the masses of chemical isotopes” [1]. 
 
What is person-centred care? Do we want health and social 
care to be more person-centred, and if so, how do we go 
about making it so? 
With the exception of the final “how to” component of 
the previous sentence, these questions might seem too 
obvious to deserve a serious answer. Surely, it makes sense 
to put persons at the centre of care.  As the authors of the 
second chapter in this new volume note [2], the claim that 
good treatment must be person-centred sounds close to 
tautological. However, as these authors, and indeed any 
readers familiar with the history of healthcare discourse 
and practice know, the devil really is in the detail. 
The ideas and terminology of person-centred care 
(PCC) have been part of health discourse for a very long 
time.  Arguments that in healthcare one treats the whole 
person, not her/his component parts, date back at least to 
antiquity [2-4] and the need to treat the patient as a person 
is articulated persuasively by clinical authors in the early 
twentieth century [5,6]. Yet it is only in recent years that 
we have seen a growing consensus in health policy and 
practice literature that PCC, and associated ideas including 
patient expertise, co-production and shared decision-
making, are not simply “fine ideals” or “ethical add-ons” 
to sound scientific clinical practice, but rather they 
represent indispensable components of any genuinely 
integrated, realistic and conceptually sound account of 
healthcare practice [7,8]. Policy documents, training 
manuals and professional practice guidelines [9-15] 
recognise both that a “person-centred” approach to care is 
essential, if we are to respond adequately to the problems 
that confront us, and that it requires a “fundamental shift in 
how we work alongside patients and individuals” [9]. 
So what, precisely, is the nature of this “fundamental 
shift” and how is it to be achieved? The answers to these 
questions are by no means obvious [9,16]. Certainly, the 
rise of multi-morbidity and chronic, socially complex 
conditions has been identified as requiring a shift in focus 
to concerns about the complexity and uniqueness of health 
and social problems [9,16-18]. A growing awareness of the 
problems of epistemic injustice and the marginalisation of 
the perspectives of large groups of people, in processes 
that directly affect their wellbeing, is also a major 
motivation for change [19-22].  Typically, calls for PCC or 
“the personalisation of care” [9,16] appear alongside a host 
of apparently related terms, including “patient-centred 
care”, “relationship-centred care”, “patient empowerment”, 
“patient engagement” and “self-management” - all terms 
used with apparently overlapping but also shifting 
meanings in the literature [7,23]. They are frequently 
associated with calls for a conceptual revision of our 
thinking about health and social care, redrawing the 
boundaries of these core concepts such that “health” 
cannot be understood in isolation from such ideas as social 
wellbeing and personal autonomy [24].   
As the language of “person-centredness” increasingly 
permeates discussions of the future of health services, the 
need for its critical analysis becomes more urgent. There is 
an unfortunate history in heath policy and practice of 
transformative ideas being foisted upon organisations, 
practitioners and patients, without those charged with the 
task of implementing the transformation being given a 
clear account of what the ideas really amount to, let alone 
their implications for practice or the cultures they are 
explicitly designed to change [25]. It has been deemed 
appropriate for major “organisational change” projects to 
be “operationalised” before being “fully conceptualised” 
[26], in the apparent hope that a shared understanding and 
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beneficial implementation of the core ideas would 
“evolve”. A predictable consequence is the privileging of 
rhetoric over substance in practical debate, sometimes 
undermining the critical and transformative ambitions that 
advocates of the approach began by articulating [25,27,28]. 
The underlying conviction of this volume - one belief 
that, despite their differences, unites all of its contributors - 
is that PCC should not become the latest “revolutionary” 
concept to be “operationalised” before being 
“conceptualised”. It is imperative that we develop an open 
and inclusive dialogue about what we do and do not mean 
by “person-centred” to inform our attempts to implement 
PCC. This will of course require time and effort to take full 
effect, and it will involve numerous dangers: as several 
contributors to the volume note, PCC can be linked to a 
range of ideas and ideologies, not all of them contributory 
to progress in health and social care. But the history of 
ideas teaches us that practices do change, ideas that were 
once obscure or peripheral can become central to our 
thinking and practice - and indeed ideas that have fallen 
out of fashion can be recognised as essential to further 
progress [29]. 
The very beginning of this indispensable process is the 
act of investigating the underlying assumptions of PCC. 
Only by doing so can we hope to discover shared meanings 
- or, alternatively, to make transparent the nature of our 
differences, as the first stage to determining how to resolve 
them. This volume brings together leading authors in the 
field from a broad range of academic and practice 
backgrounds to provide a comprehensive review of current 
thinking about PCC and related concepts. Its contributors 
include major critics of PCC as well as its steadfast 
advocates. The sheer diversity of the contributions reflects 
the complexity of the issues and challenges we must 
confront if we are to advance our understanding of PCC 
and to realise its progressive potential. As the clinician 
who supplied the quotation featured at the start of this 
editorial observed, interacting with and understanding 
persons requires a firm grasp of scientific reasoning, but it 
also requires much more.   
In their efforts to characterise what “more” is needed, 
authors challenge us to re-evaluate the nature of and 
relationships between knowledge, evidence, meaning, 
value, patient experience and the social context of care, as 
well as the social context of research and knowledge 
production. Chapters address the relation between 
scientific thinking and broader conceptions of human 
reasoning, practical wisdom and epistemic hierarchies, 
biomedical reductionism, the ontology of health and 
disease and the relationship between PCC and evidence-
based healthcare (EBHC). Authors examine our 
understanding of causality as it informs both PCC and 
EBHC, the role of complexity and function in our broad 
understanding of health, the distinction between organisms 
and mechanisms, as well as the epistemic role of narrative, 
the nature of personhood and agency, epistemic injustice 
and shared decision-making. Several chapters focus on the 
specific problems of being person-centred in the context of 
mental healthcare, while others alert us to the political and 
ideological aspects of the debate, with reference to 
consumerism, neo-liberalism and the economic context of 
current health service delivery. While none of these 
contributions, individually or collectively, represents the 
“final word” on the philosophy of PCC, they do give us the 
basis for an intellectually serious assessment of the 
concept’s scope, limitations, and potential to influence 
practice for the good. Perhaps most importantly, the 
reader’s interaction with the arguments and counter-
arguments presented will better equip her to assess and 
where necessary challenge claims about the extent to 
which her own practice or treatment can be meaningfully 
characterised as “person-centred”. 
 
 
Rhetoric, meaning and context: 
how to bridge the theory-practice 
gap? 
 
The book is an extended exercise in critical thinking about 
the meaning and value of PCC. It is entirely appropriate, 
therefore, that Arnold et al, [2] offer an insightful critique 
of person-centred healthcare (PCH) and associated ideas, 
including patient empowerment. Noting the problems with 
contemporary attempts to implement PCC/PCH1, Mark 
Arnold, Ian Kerridge and Wendy Lipworth are careful to 
distinguish numerous “rich and varied” philosophical 
constructions of PCH from PCH as “defined and 
implemented in clinical, institutional and public policy” 
[2]. The philosophical accounts “build from complex ideas 
about humanism and identity” and many have progressive 
aspirations, including “exposing the power inequalities in 
Society and in healthcare”. These accounts, they stress, are 
not the target of their critique, and they even suggest that 
“the phrase ‘person-centred’ may be worth retaining”. 
However, they note that the underlying commitments of 
such accounts to core philosophical ideas such as patient 
autonomy and the right to self-determination, when 
combined with “the lack of definitional clarity regarding 
its meaning or practical applications”, can lead to the 
conflation of PCH with “consumer-driven healthcare”.  
They proceed to offer an effective critique of consumerism 
in healthcare and challenge authors of the philosophical 
accounts “to consider how these accounts are being 
(mis)represented in practice and consider whether PCH in 
its hypothetical form can in fact be translated meaningfully 
into practice given the constraints of existing practices, 
structures and attitudes”. 
Their chapter reflects concerns mentioned above 
(articulated by advocates as well as critics of PCC) and 
spelled out in more detail elsewhere [25,30-32]. There is a 
sense in which academic movements can become ‘victims 
of their own success’: the terminology of a movement can 
become widely adopted by governments and policy 
organisations, but the price paid for this is the de facto 
dilution of its substantive meaning and associated loss of 
critical potential. The most striking precedent is that of 
                                                          
1 Some authors use the abbreviation PCC, preferring to talk about 
person-centred ‘care’, while others use PCH, preferring to talk 
about person-centred ‘healthcare’.  
Loughlin 
 
Editorial Introduction 
 
22 
“evidence-based”. As numerous authors have noted, the 
language of “evidence-based”, originating in a paper 
proposing “evidence-based medicine (EBM)” as initiating 
“revolutionary” changes to the teaching of clinical practice 
[33], has migrated from its initial context, to become 
embedded within professional and organisational discourse 
in a vast range of areas: “Most professional societies, the 
public, and funding agencies have accepted EBM with 
remarkable enthusiasm. The concept of evidence-based 
practice is now applied in management, education, 
criminology and social work” [34]. Some authors celebrate 
this migration, and the linguistic shift from EBM to 
broader notions of evidence-based healthcare and 
evidence-based practice, demonstrating that EBM has 
“evolved”, “so much” and “so rapidly”, “spreading like 
fire” to “guidelines, manuals, training days, seminars and 
workshops … across the globe” [35]. 
Others are less celebratory.2 They note that the 
dissemination of the language of evidence-based practice 
has been accompanied by unacceptably wide variation in 
its implementation and “misappropriation” of the 
“evidence-based brand” by “vested interests” [27]. It has 
led to care that is “management driven rather than patient 
centred”.  Such consequences, the authors argue, were 
never intended by the founders of EBM [27]. They 
represent the spread of the rhetoric of “evidence-based” in 
the absence of a clear explanation of (or agreement on) its 
substantive import and implications for the real challenges 
and controversies facing health practice [25,28,36]. 
There have, of course, been numerous attempts to 
overcome the lack of clarity, bridging the theory-practice 
gap for EBM, and more recently giving an indication of 
how EBM can integrate a key concern driving the 
movement for PCC: the need to incorporate a serious 
consideration of the “values and preferences” of those 
receiving healthcare into any defensible account of clinical 
decision-making.  As the authors of our third chapter, 
Mathew Mercuri and Amiram Gafni [37] note, the “Grades 
of Recommendation, Assessment, Development, and 
Evaluation (GRADE) framework” is an attempt to produce 
evidence-based clinical recommendations that can not only 
guide practice but, via “the inclusion of values and 
preferences into the EBM framework”, can make the 
practice of EBM “more person-centered”. 
Unfortunately, their detailed analysis reveals that the 
understanding of “values and preferences” within the 
GRADE framework is far from clear: “how one defines, 
measures, and uses information regarding values and 
preferences to determine the best treatment option for a 
patient, when practicing EBM” is effectively left to the 
user of the framework to determine [37]. The authors of 
GRADE offer no clear account of the notions of value and 
preference (or of the distinction, if any, between these key 
concepts) and the reliance on information about what the 
“typical” patient prefers suggests a mindset grounded in 
population-level studies, unlikely to take into account a 
core concern of defenders of PCC, that each individual’s 
specific life context is relevant to determining the best 
course of action in any particular case. 
                                                          
2 Again, notably, they include some regarded as critics of 
EBM/EBHC and others identified as its staunch defenders. 
Unsurprisingly, there is no substitute for conceptual 
clarification if theory hopes to provide a coherent and 
demonstrable basis for practice. If PCC is to avoid the 
“crisis” afflicting the EBM movement [27] then its 
defenders must rise to this challenge. While Bill Fulford 
does not dispute the need for conceptual clarification, his 
chapter resists the characterisation of the problem as a 
“lack of definitional clarity”, arguing that the search for a 
definitive account of PCC is misguided [38]. A different 
kind of underlying “philosophical field work” is needed. 
Citing the methods of “ordinary language philosophy”, 
Fulford argues that we understand the meanings of terms 
not by searching for definitions but by systematically 
examining their use in context, with a view to mapping a 
term’s “logical geography”. This method is particularly 
appropriate for what he calls “higher level” concepts, 
including “person” and “care”. 
Fulford illustrates his approach with reference to two 
influential articles on PCC. Construed as offering 
definitions of PCC (which is how the authors of each piece 
characterise their work) they are incompatible. However, 
analysed by the methods of ordinary language philosophy, 
these distinct approaches “become fully complementary”, 
and the result is not “conceptual chaos”, but rather “a more 
complete understanding of the meaning of person-centred 
care that in turn offers a more effective basis for 
implementation” [38]. 
While I agree with Fulford that distinct accounts can 
reveal what he calls different and compatible “aspects” of 
PCC, in the fifth chapter I argue that the goal of mapping 
the usage of the key terms is indeed necessary, but by no 
means sufficient in gaining a coherent understanding of the 
meaning and value of PCC - let alone one that could 
provide the basis for its effective implementation [39]. I 
note that Fulford evidently agrees with Arnold et al. [2] 
that consumerist accounts of PCC are not legitimate - or to 
use his word, “genuine” - applications of the terminology 
of PCC. He argues that “genuine” PCC provides a proper 
balance between the “extremes” of paternalism and 
consumerism.   This language is clearly normative, going 
beyond what Fulford characterises as the “empirical” 
exercise of mapping uses.   
The language of PCC - like that of “evidence” and 
“ethics” - “is not simply diverse, it is contested” [39]. 
Fulford clearly would not support forms of PCC which 
involve transforming the “patient” into a “customer”, 
thereby endorsing the sort of consumerism denounced by 
such authors as Yves Aquino [40]. The patient might 
indeed say she wants “big-eye surgery”, for example, but it 
does not follow logically that we respect her personhood or 
give her proper, person-centred care by providing it. Real 
patient empowerment in this case might well require 
challenging the racist and misogynistic culture and 
campaigns advanced as driving this demand [40,41]. The 
exercise of “mapping logical geography” might help 
“inform (or remind) us that a map of the territory of 
healthcare has no clear borders, such that, by following its 
links to their logical limits, we will find ourselves 
inevitably in the midst of broader dialogues about the 
social nature of persons, the nature of value, agency and 
the basis for our obligations to one another” [39]. 
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In the sixth chapter, Nicola Blunden and Gideon Calder 
address some of these challenges  [42], discussing the key 
political and ideological concerns raised by Arnold and 
colleagues, in particular their worries about social context 
and the extent to which PCC can “be translated 
meaningfully into practice given the constraints of existing 
practices, structures and attitudes” [2]. Focussing on the 
economic concept of co-production, they accept that in a 
political context that can be broadly characterised as “neo-
liberal,” both co-production and PCC “may be articulated 
or endorsed in ways which run either with the grain of 
neoliberalism, or against it” [42]. The original, core values 
of PCC are (as Arnold et al. [2] imply) compelling, but 
also often at odds with an instrumentalising, target-
focused, commodified, transactional culture of care. While 
not “inherently immune to absorption into neoliberal 
institutional logic”, both co-production and PCC can 
provide practically realisable ways of “subverting and 
circumventing” those aspects of neoliberal culture least 
hospitable to person-centredness in the institutional setting. 
This, they argue, requires “a retrieval of the explicitly 
political nature of both, in the sense that they depend on 
and contribute to the kinds of space for contestation and 
deliberation about the good - or ‘substantive ethos’ - which 
neoliberalism seeks to deny” [42]. 
Their important analysis is followed by a series of 
chapters that further expand the debate, arguing 
convincingly that PCC provides us with a great 
opportunity: to make explicit what are in fact much needed 
revisions to our conceptual framework, to our 
understanding of what the human organism is (ontology), 
the nature of knowledge (epistemology) and its 
relationship with ideas such as purpose and value. Authors 
focus on aspects of the ‘modern’ world view - in particular 
the “reductionism” assumed by much of biomedical 
science, once a cause of much progress but which is (so the 
authors argue) now standing in the way of further progress 
in terms of our treatment of real people in real contexts. 
 
 
Conceptual foundations: rejecting 
false dichotomies 
 
In a characteristically inspiring contribution, the late 
Stephen Tyreman distinguishes two ways of understanding 
PCC - asking whether it is “a humanitarian addition to 
good medical practice” or “a truly fundamental essential of 
good practice” requiring a fundamental shift in our 
understanding of the human creature [43]? If we take the 
former option, then PCC is simply a matter of considering 
a person’s “needs and wishes” in the course of a project 
whose primary goal remains applying science (as currently 
understood) to the project of “mending the body”. This 
understanding of PCC (reminiscent of GRADE’s 
incorporation of “preferences and values” into EBM) gives 
us “merely desirable”, but not “compelling”, reasons to be 
person-centred. 
In contrast to this more modest view, Tyreman’s 
understanding of PCC is philosophically far more radical: 
“Human beings, like all living creatures, are organisms not 
mechanisms.” The crucial differences between the two 
have been recognised for many centuries (and are 
explained in texts in ancient philosophy), but in the 
modern era “medicine has largely focused on body 
mechanisms for its theory and practice”. He recognises that 
the modern era “has seen dramatic increases in knowledge 
and technological innovation” and a consequence of this 
has been a “further focus on the body as a machine and a 
failure to consider the implications of the organism for 
human health”. Despite this historical association of 
mechanistic reasoning with progress, Tyreman argues that 
at this point in intellectual history we need to “put the 
organic horse back in front of the mechanical cart”, to 
rediscover insights that have been sidelined (if not entirely 
forgotten) in modern times. 
The chapter explains with great clarity the significance 
of this conceptual shift for our understanding and treatment 
of health problems. Organisms are “essentially whole at all 
stages of their development” (in contrast to machines that 
are not whole until assembled from component parts) and 
“always in transition in response to the ever-changing 
environment”. Framing our understanding of humans in 
this way gives us the basis for an understanding of 
biological processes with reference to the broader ideas of 
purpose, meaning and narrative that define our 
personhood. 
Tyreman’s approach is complemented by Richard 
Hamilton’s impressively detailed and theoretically rich 
analysis of a very broad range of biological and social 
scientific discourses and disciplines relevant to the “nature-
culture dichotomy” [44]. Only by understanding the 
history of ideas that led to the development of this 
dichotomy can we “overcome” it, to develop an 
understanding of “the person as organism” capable of 
meeting what Hamilton (citing di Sarsina and Tassinari) 
sees as the key challenge confronting medicine in the 
current era: how to “broaden our concepts of science and 
medicine to investigate and heal the human being as a 
whole in a scientific way?” 
For Hamilton, the “starting point” for this vital 
enterprise is the recognition that “the whole human being 
is not a composite made up of biological and cultural bits” 
because “culture goes all the way down, while biology 
goes all the way up”. Persons cannot be divided in this way 
because they are “not discrete objects.” Just as Tyreman 
cited the process philosopher Whitehead, so Hamilton 
argues that we need a radical conceptual shift in our 
understanding of persons, seeing “personhood as itself one 
process among many” [44]. Once this shift is 
accomplished, “the existence of genuine agency becomes 
less of an anomaly than it is on most standard accounts” - 
the perceived need (demonstrated by Hamilton’s detailed 
history of ideas) to “explain away” agency is based on an 
implicit picture that embodies “a false contrast between 
organisms as hapless objects acted on by forces beyond 
their control and a supernatural conception of human 
persons mysteriously transcending the natural world”. 
Our ninth chapter focuses not on the nature-culture 
dichotomy but on a related distinction, between the person 
and his or her disease. Like Tyreman, Alexandra Pârvan 
considers a common understanding of PCC as a 
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humanitarian addition to healthcare practice, requiring 
practitioners “to show concern, human kindness or 
personal involvement in a case” [3]. She contrasts this to 
her favoured conception of PCC as “a method of working,” 
built upon a rejection of what has become an “instinctive” 
ontology for many practitioners and patients - the “split 
between disease/body and person”. No matter how 
empathic and scientifically competent the professional may 
be, no matter how resolutely she refuses to “reduce” the 
person to a disease category, until this ontology is revised, 
she will fail to practise in an effectively person-centred 
way, directing treatment to a “bordered disease entity ... 
which is contained in the person.” This implicit 
“substantialisation” of disease, treating it as a distinct 
entity “residing in” the person, inclines us to conceptualise 
the quest for health as the search for the most effective 
ways to “remove” or eliminate the disease entity, with the 
goal of restoring the patient to full health. 
With reference both to real cases and an insightful 
analysis of the history of our thinking about the ontology 
of health and illness, Pârvan shows both the limitations of 
approaches based on the “instinctive” ontology and the 
potentials of a person-centred approach based on an 
alternative ontology. Only by rejecting the view of disease 
as a “natural kind” can we revise both research and 
practice to develop an approach that treats people as 
individuals, understanding their needs and health status 
within the context of their specific and unique lives. The 
chapter explains the crucial experience of “being healthy-
with-disease” and its liberating potential for persons living 
with a wide range of diagnosed health conditions. 
Harald Walach’s chapter on “the materialist stance of 
biomedicine” [45] uses the term “materialist” in a way that 
is equivalent to how other contributors use the terms 
“reductionist” [46] or “physicalist” [43] to contrast a 
mechanistic understanding of health, illness and disease 
with a “fuller, humanistic account of life and disease, 
illness, suffering and healing” [45]. He uses the current 
popularity of complementary and alternative medicine 
(CAM) to argue that there is something missing in 
conventional healthcare that patients who turn to CAM are 
seeking.  While there is a distinct difference in tone to the 
chapter by Hamilton (who associates CAM with an 
“obscurantist hostility to scientific medicine and an 
openness to untried and possibly dangerous alternatives” 
[44]) both would agree that its popularity requires 
explaining with reference to what conventional medicine is 
currently failing to provide, and there is in fact a 
remarkable similarity (despite their different starting 
points) in their analyses of the history of medical and 
broader scientific thinking that has brought us to our 
current position. 
Walach characterises the dominant approach (as does 
Sturmberg, to follow) as a “paradigm”, and the chapter 
includes a very helpful section on the use of this 
terminology in debates about medical epistemology. He 
identifies what Tyreman would characterise as the dawn of 
the “modern” era with the 17th Century philosophy 
articulated most powerfully by Rene Descartes, who 
postulated that all animals are, quite literally, machines 
[45]. As Hamilton observed, Descartes escaped denying 
the obvious fact of our own consciousness by regarding it 
as something which “transcends” the body3 and, like both 
Tyreman and Hamilton, Walach recognises that this 
modern paradigm gave rise to extraordinary advances in 
mechanistic understanding. This is because a paradigm 
“steers the collective attention and effort of the scientific 
community”, leading its members “to expect certain things 
rather than others, to focus on some aspects and to neglect 
others”. As such it “directs attention, resources and effort” 
and “thus partitions the world into worthwhile and 
negligible aspects”. This direction of our collective focus 
will of course have limitations as well as advantages, 
causing us to ignore or explain away phenomena that 
might otherwise simply be treated as obvious features of 
our world. 
For Joachim Sturmberg, the key distinction between the 
current, dominant paradigm and the emerging, person-
centred paradigm, is that the former treats health and 
disease primarily as “structural phenomena”, while the 
latter regards them as “ecological phenomena”, the result 
of “complex adaptive physiological dynamics within the 
person” [4]. In a chapter that integrates ideas endorsed by 
the authors of each of the previous four chapters, 
Sturmberg argues that the prevailing “structural mindset” 
is based on finding the “seat of disease” to deliver “cure-
focused care”. While this is undoubtedly appropriate in 
some cases, the current complexity of health problems 
requires a shift to a more “functional mindset,” 
conceptualising health and disease with reference to “a 
dynamic response to constantly changing demands,” 
understanding the “interdependencies between the 
particulars of this person’s internal regulatory networks 
and his external environment”. The subtle but vital shift 
from “looking at disease as a problem in the person” to 
seeing it as a “problem for the person to adapt to” can 
facilitate a “return” to our “healing roots”, enabling a 
proactive approach to “achieving” and “maintaining” 
health across the life stages in contrast to the dominant 
“reactive” approach. 
The chapter considers the implications of the paradigm 
shift for health policy, addressing issues discussed by 
authors in the previous section, regarding consumerism 
and prevailing neoliberal social and economic doctrine, 
and raising questions about value as conceived in market 
terms and with reference to the common good [4]. 
Sturmberg concludes that the new paradigm will render the 
question of whether medicine is “an art or a science” 
strictly meaningless, founded on a dualistic divide and 
reductionist focus that needs to be abandoned if progress is 
to be possible. 
Our twelfth chapter includes a wonderful illustration of 
this broad approach to understanding and treating a 
particular case [46]. Eline Thornquist and Anna Luise 
Kirkengen urge their fellow clinicians and researchers to 
reframe their thinking, to “strive for a view that takes 
human conditions seriously and links subjectivity and 
sociality to the body.” Such a reconceptualisation is “a 
fundamental premise for both superseding traditional 
dichotomies between matter/mind and nature/culture” and 
for “replacing the compartmentalization of the body” with 
a more integrated, genuinely holistic view of persons. The 
                                                          
3 Hence Ryle’s phrase “the ghost in the machine” [47]. 
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idea of a purely “biological body” is a construct that may 
have served the development of certain medical 
specialities, but only the concept of “the lived body” can 
enable us to recognise and respond adequately to the 
realities of health and illness. 
The authors make astute use of the concept of 
“integrity”, which since the work of Aristotle has been 
central to understanding the links between physical and 
personal aspects of our humanity, noting that “an ability to 
differentiate between self and endangering other is 
manifest on all existential levels, from the cellular to that 
of personhood”. Social life is “an embodied affair,” and 
they offer a vivid illustration of the significance of this 
claim with reference to the real case of a person presenting 
as “medically unexplained” but nonetheless with 
manifestly real and serious problems. The failure of 
traditional medical methods to understand this person’s 
suffering brings out the fundamental importance of 
recognising that human beings “live in a world of meaning, 
and that this is not an additional matter - a ‘human’ 
appendage to the ‘real’ clinical practice and research work, 
but the very basis of both.” The ontology they defend, 
which “recognizes and takes account of the body as being - 
simultaneously - a biological phenomenon and an 
experiencing and expressive socio-cultural being”, requires 
us to re-evaluate other conceptual dichotomies, including 
the distinction between epistemology and ethics. The 
divide, which as they note is central to positivist 
approaches that have influenced thinking in medical 
epistemology, between “objective knowledge” and 
“subjective value”, is unsustainable if we are to understand 
human beings, giving rise to the urgent need to develop 
“an ethically informed epistemology in medicine and the 
health care sector”. These points will be taken up in detail 
by the chapters in our next section, on value. 
 
 
Integrating knowledge and value 
 
James Marcum’s chapter provides a refreshingly radical 
challenge to the reductionist and scientistic frameworks 
criticised by our preceding authors. His “Axiological 
Analysis for the Role of Values in Person-Centered 
Healthcare” [48] incorporates a detailed exposition of the 
role of not only epistemic and ethical value, but also 
aesthetic value in an account of person-centred reasoning 
and decision-making in practice. Marcum grounds his 
analysis in a specific conception of personhood which 
identifies the human good with the “flourishing of each 
individual person within a community,” incorporating the 
realisation of our definitively human potentials, including 
“self-transcendence”, “truth-seeking”, “interpersonal 
communion and love”. 
The concept of value is explained with reference to 
normative commitments, definitive of rational agency. For 
instance, the commitment to truth and understanding 
provides the foundation for logical and analytical 
reasoning, without which the human activity of science is 
impossible [48].4 The activity of care requires a 
fundamental commitment to the value of human dignity, 
“the chief value that drives PCH”. Marcum argues that in 
addition to these epistemic and ethical values, the aesthetic 
value of beauty is an essential component of our 
understanding of health and care. It is worth noting that he 
distinguishes this concept from the highly questionable 
considerations of “beauty” alluded to above (with 
reference to the demand for “big eye surgery”). For 
Marcum the quest for beauty is not about “cosmetic 
surgery”, but rather it is a fundamental component of our 
understanding of order, meaning and wellbeing, the 
grounding of our ability to look at a human being as a 
“flourishing whole”. Like other contributors to this volume 
(most notably Pârvan) he argues that our ability to practise 
well and to perceive the value in the lives of others 
involves the utilisation of our aesthetic or “artistic” 
capacities, which are inseparable from our ability to 
understand order and structure in the world. 
The chapter co-authored by Jean-Philippe Pierron and 
Didier Vinot succinctly explains the need for a systematic 
account of the meaning of “value” in PCC, noting that “the 
world of care is a world structured by and saturated with 
values” [50]. While we can distinguish empirical from 
normative enquiries, we cannot have adequate knowledge 
of any complex area of human life without an integration 
of both, because human life is “a normative activity”. The 
authors characterise health economics as “a normative 
scientific discipline”, but echoing the concerns of other 
contributors, including Arnold et al. [2], Blunden and 
Calder [42] and Sturmberg [4], they note the temptation to 
effectively reduce all value to market value in health policy 
and management. The attractions of what they call 
“economism” in an organisational context are obvious, and 
have led to the development of such “scientific” methods 
for measuring the value of care as the “QALY” (Quality 
Adjusted Life Year). As they argue, such “economism” 
helps organisations to demonstrate “value for money” to 
funders, but in the process “problematically simplifies the 
world of care” and imposes its method of evaluation as 
“the” method [50]. Health economics fails to “measure 
correctly the value of person-centred care” because “the 
latter amounts to a rupture with the underlying 
anthropology of homo economicus, which presides over 
the omnipresence of analyses in terms of cost and 
benefits”. 
Far from this making PCC “unrealistic” in the context 
of current care systems, the authors suggest it is a needed 
response (or part of such a response) to an emerging 
“crisis” in Western social systems.  The causes of the crisis 
are numerous and include “deficiencies” in systems of 
social protection, “the increase in the duration of human 
lives” and “the growth in the number of chronic illnesses” 
[50]. These elements “call for a reform of the system” and 
methods of evaluation that incorporate the plurality of the 
values of care. That said, the authors are clear that this 
process is extremely challenging, because the values to be 
                                                          
4 As others have noted [29,49], conceptions of “objective 
science” that reduce all value-commitments to subjective  
preferences undermine the rational basis of science itself. 
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incorporated are not only diverse but potentially 
contradictory - including agency and individual autonomy, 
community values and professional values, ranging from 
the values of truth and objectivity in biomedicine to 
conceptions of social justice and organisational efficiency. 
The training of carers requires “new skills” to help 
confront the ethical challenges and paradoxes inherent in 
contemporary practice. 
The fifteenth chapter, co-authored by Jens Gaab, Marco 
Annoni, Charlotte Blease, Heike Gerger and Cosima 
Locher, builds on ideas evident in the work of  Sturmberg 
and others, regarding homeostasis, the complexity of the 
organism and “its organization with and within fellow 
organisms” [51]. Their goal is to develop an analysis of 
what we mean by “treatment”, with reference to what 
should be achieved by treatment and how it is achieved. 
They argue persuasively that a conceptually adequate 
account of “good treatment” must incorporate “biological, 
psychological and social treatment constituents in the 
context of ethical considerations”, proposing a 
“biopsychosocioethical” model.   
The authors stress that this model is not intended as a 
“definitive and distinct approach to clinical decision and 
management”, but rather it proposes a fundamental 
“conceptual frame” for the discussion of particular cases. 
The complexity and diversity of real cases makes it 
difficult to define an “ultimate end” for treatment, but the 
model's account of the value of care makes it possible to 
distinguish “intrinsically person-centred” from more 
restricted, disease-centred approaches. They make 
important points about the role of deliberateness and trust 
in any sound account of good treatment, introducing 
arguments about the agency of patients, the virtues of 
practitioners and the concept of shared decision-making, 
that will be taken up in more detail in later chapters in this 
volume. 
 
 
Clinical reasoning: cases, evidence 
and wisdom 
 
As Mark Tonelli notes, while PCC requires recognition of 
the personhood of both practitioner and patient, the 
processes of diagnosis, prognosis and treatment require 
patients to become cases [52]. He acknowledges (citing 
Foucault) that there are risks associated with becoming “a 
case,” but the main argument of his chapter is that, 
properly applied, a “renewed focus on case-based 
reasoning in clinical medicine” offers the best prospect of 
implementing a genuinely person-centred approach to 
clinical practice. 
For Tonelli, the dominance of the EBM movement’s 
approach to clinical reasoning since the early 1990s has 
made medical practice demonstrably less person-centred, 
emphasising a reliance on “deductive reasoning from 
general knowledge,” in particular “randomized trials and 
meta-analyses”. While there has been much discussion 
about how to “integrate” the context-specific features of 
particular cases into this model of clinical reasoning, it is a 
framework that effectively reduces such vital 
considerations to the status of “anecdote”, by implication a 
“lower grade” of evidence than population-level studies. 
The reliance on randomised trials and probabilistic 
reasoning “suggests to clinicians that particulars of the 
case are unimportant, incidental features to be obscured by 
chance allocation” [52]. 
The chapter provides an admirably clear and accessible 
explanation of the casuistry associated with thinkers such 
as Toulmin, arguing that, properly understood, clinical 
decision-making “resembles a form of argumentation” 
rather than a deduction from general propositions to 
specific recommendations. He explains how analogical 
reasoning from exemplar cases “allows clinicians to focus 
again on the care of individuals, better able to incorporate 
the variability that distinguishes one from another”. The 
history of case-based argumentation is “particularly rich in 
moral deliberation” and casuistry “relies upon acquiring 
and focusing on knowledge of particulars”. Reading 
Tonelli’s chapter in the light of the preceding contributions 
is fulfilling, in that it indicates a clear way in which the 
thinking of PCC can directly influence practice. 
In the seventeenth chapter, Roger Kerry, Matthew Low 
and Peter O’Sullivan take as their starting point the 
discrepancy between traditional clinical reasoning models 
and conceptions of clinical practice developed in the light 
of “evidence-based medicine, now more commonly 
referred to as healthcare (EBHC)” [53]. Like Tonelli, they 
regard the latter as an inadequate basis for PCC. Despite 
recent attempts to revise or reform EBHC, its “essence” is 
still “in the prioritisation of particular scientific research 
methods which generate knowledge and information about 
healthcare”. The chapter argues that it is the specific 
conception of scientific reasoning embodied by EBCH that 
places it in tension with the key insights of PCC: in 
particular, its notion of causal reasoning. 
They note that: “the movement for PCC has developed 
at least in part as a recognition of the need for clinical 
reasoning to incorporate an understanding of the potential 
uniqueness of individual cases into its account of scientific 
reasoning.” In contrast, the movement for EBHC was 
founded on a conception of causal reasoning grounded in 
the work of the philosopher David Hume [53]. Hume’s 
conception of causality is inherently resistant to the idea of 
uniqueness - to explain an event causally is, by definition, 
to regard it as an instance of a general pattern: if the 
observation of X is repeatedly followed by the observation 
of Y, then we have grounds to posit a causal link between 
X and Y. Causal reasoning becomes a matter of finding 
statistical regularities, what Hume calls “constant 
conjunctions” between events of type X and type Y. Hence 
the centrality of “large-scale clinical trials” and 
probabilistic reasoning in EBHC and the de-emphasising 
of context-specific knowledge and clinical experience. 
They propose an alternative, dispositional analysis of 
causality, “based on a dispositional philosophy of science 
that takes causes not as discrete Humean statistical 
regularities, but rather as real features of the world that 
only ever tend towards an effect, and that are dependent on 
mutual manifestations with other causal partners.” This 
“revised causal ontology” is the basis for clinical reasoning 
models “better able to explain and facilitate the integration 
of multiple sources of knowledge and information during 
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clinical decision-making processes in complex and 
context-sensitive instances.” 
Sarah Weiten’s contribution takes on board the tension 
between EBM and PCC highlighted by authors such as 
Tonelli, Kerry and colleagues. Her chapter considers the 
possibility that “personalised medicine” - now more often, 
and more accurately, characterised as “precision medicine” 
- might provide the basis for a “more person-centred” 
approach to clinical practice, precisely because of the focus 
not on the sort of regularities that Kerry and colleagues 
note as the basis for reasoning in EBHC, but on features 
specific to an individual patient - his or her genetic make-
up [54]. Wieten argues that, even if the predictions that 
“EBM will soon be replaced by genetics-based precision 
medicine” turn out to be correct, this does not imply that 
practice will become, in any meaningful sense, more 
person-centred. Despite its differences with EBM, 
precision-medicine generates related problems regarding 
the expertise of practitioners, the role of mechanisms in 
clinical reasoning and the role of patient values in any 
defensible conception of clinical decision-making. 
Wieten’s chapter is a very pertinent and helpful 
illustration of the points made by other contributors to this 
volume.  (One is reminded particularly of Tyreman’s 
concerns about the claim that genes provide the “blue-
print” for the person [43] but, as already noted in this 
editorial introduction to the book, the broad concerns about 
reductionism or scientism are at work in many of the 
chapters). The problems which beset medical epistemology 
go far beyond the discourses of EBM/EBHC. These 
discourses have of course been affected by the underlying 
philosophical framework that mitigates against PCC, but 
the intellectual task facing proponents of PCC is to identify 
that framework and all of its manifestations, developing 
and defending their alternative approach. In this respect, 
her chapter resonates with the one to follow, where another 
feature of thinking in medical epistemology, sometimes 
identified as incompatible with PCC, is argued to have 
both valid and (philosophically) “corrupted” forms. 
Chapter 19, co-authored by Peter Wyer and Loughlin, 
focusses on the role of epistemic hierarchies in accounts of 
clinical reasoning [55]. While we agree with the other 
authors in this section [52-54] and other critics of the uses 
of such hierarchies in debates about medical epistemology 
[56,57], we argue that defenders of EBM/EBCH are right 
on one crucial point, that “the notion of an epistemic 
hierarchy is indeed indispensable” [55]. The problem with 
the “hierarchies of evidence” that have dominated much of 
the debate about evidence-based practice for so long is that 
they devalue the human reasoning processes that are the 
basis for rational thought in research and practice. Based 
on flawed understandings of such core concepts as 
“objectivity” and “engagement”, and the distorted 
dissection of the subject-object relationship exposed by 
authors in the preceding sections of this volume, they 
attempt to “depersonalise” practice in all the wrong ways. 
Science is a human practice, founded in a broader 
conception of human reasoning, ontologically dependent 
on human beings living and engaging with the world in 
social, emotional and ethical contexts. Too much of the 
debate about clinical reasoning fails to appreciate the 
significance of these points, leading authors to espouse an 
intellectually indefensible conception of science as the 
basis for models of clinical reasoning that devalue the 
personhood of practitioners. 
After looking at different conceptions of epistemic 
hierarchies and their uses in the analysis and evaluation of 
reasoning in a range of practice contexts, we propose a 
“nested hierarchy” that effectively turns upside-down the 
flawed “evidence hierarchies” that have helped to 
depersonalise care. T.S. Eliot’s “wisdom, knowledge, 
information” scheme (to which we add “data” below 
“information”) provides a model for a “person-centred 
epistemic hierarchy” [55]. This crucial, “person-centred 
inversion” represents “levels of awareness that characterize 
more or less developed thinking and judgment on the part 
of the particular practitioner”. In a section on “practical 
applications” we illustrate the utility and necessity of this 
construct. 
Samantha Copeland’s chapter opens with the important 
point that “person-centred” care is frequently conflated 
with “patient-centred” approaches, via the recognition that 
“the patient is a complex, situated individual with diverse 
interests” [58]. However, it is just as important for PCC to 
develop a conception of clinical decision-making that fully 
recognises the personhood of practitioners. Citing 
Montgomery, Copeland introduces the Aristotelian idea of 
“practical reasoning, or phronesis” as a way of integrating 
moral reasoning, context-specific knowledge and 
experience into “a framework for understanding the nature 
of clinical expertise”. 
Despite its attractions, Copeland notes that there are 
serious issues confronting the project of incorporating this 
notion of practical wisdom into a workable model of 
clinical practice. For Copeland “the reasoning process 
itself should take priority in our attempts to understand the 
nature of clinical expertise,” rather than questions about 
“whether that process obtains any particular end” [58]. A 
theme clearly emerging from our diverse contributors 
(coming, as they do, from very different intellectual 
starting-points) is the need for genuinely “person-centred” 
approaches to care to focus on questions of process rather 
than outcomes - whether those outcomes are characterised 
with reference to clinical factors, the “values and 
preferences” of particular patients, or even the character-
traits of professionals and the development of virtuous 
practice. We have seen that the health, wellbeing and 
autonomy of patients are better understood with reference 
to developmental and adaptive processes, relating to 
functioning within broader social and interpersonal 
contexts [4,42-46]. Copeland agrees, arguing against the 
equation of “success in healthcare” with “obtaining the 
state of being fully healthy”.  Similarly, the understanding 
of clinical expertise is best framed “in relational terms,” 
within the context of an interactive process: “in the case of 
truly person-centered healthcare, there is more to be 
achieved through the mutual engagement of persons who 
practise healthcare and persons who seek their expertise 
than the return to a predetermined state of health” [58]. Her 
contribution is followed by chapters that specifically focus 
on this interaction, with reference to the processes of 
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shared decision-making, interactional expertise, epistemic 
injustice and the moral and epistemic role of narrative. 
 
 
Patient expertise, authority, 
narrative and shared decision-
making 
 
As noted in the opening section of this Editorial 
Introduction, a major motivation for PCC has been a 
growing awareness of the problems of epistemic injustice 
and the marginalisation of the perspectives of particular 
patient groups. The chapter by Garrath Williams opens by 
noting that, minimally, a person-centred approach to 
healthcare requires that patients’ accounts of their own 
illness and treatment, and their experience of healthcare 
professionals and systems, must be taken seriously [19].  
Yet he also cites research revealing that medical 
professionals frequently fail to elicit patients’ accounts of 
their condition, or may ignore, disbelieve or discredit some 
of what patients say about their symptoms, side-effects or 
treatment. 
For Williams, the first stage in overcoming this “major 
obstacle to the development of person-centred healthcare” 
is developing an accurate account of its nature and causes. 
The very development of the term “epistemic injustice” 
represents an important advance. As Miranda Fricker, who 
coined the term, has pointed out, a common problem for 
sufferers of numerous social injustices is that they lack a 
language in terms of which to characterise their situation 
adequately [21]. 
Williams acknowledges the temptation of the “bad 
apples” theory, that attributes vices to individual 
professionals, but he comments astutely that “Justice may 
name a virtue, but it is primarily a feature of social 
structures” [19]. The chapter therefore focusses on 
structural and relational features of current healthcare 
encounters that create difficulties for professionals in 
hearing the “patient voice”.  Citing the work of such 
authors as Havi Carel and Ian Kidd, Williams discusses the 
nature of professional authority and institutional power, 
explaining the difficulties patients have in articulating their 
claims with reference to what he calls “tightrope walking” 
and “double binds”: the “moral balancing acts” required of 
ill persons and the impossibility they may find in 
reconciling duties and demands. The chapter considers the 
options and pressures facing medical professionals, 
requiring them to seek out “paths of least resistance” and 
“the invisibility of power positions” to persons in 
authority. Williams argues that this characterisation 
represents a “diagnosis” and concludes by considering a 
number of “treatment options”. 
One such option, the recognition of patient expertise, is 
characterised and defended in extraordinary detail and 
clarity in Chapter 22 [59]. Mary-Clair Yelovich begins by 
observing that, while many practical problems in medicine 
are soluble “within a traditional, well-established 
epistemological framework”, the ones that are not 
demonstrate problems with our underlying assumptions 
and limits for the framework itself. One such problem, she 
argues, is “patient non-adherence”, and its solution 
“requires a revision of our assumptions about what we 
accept as valid knowledge or relevant expertise”.  With 
reference to literature on the relationship between scientific 
and other forms of expertise, she goes on to spell out 
precisely the nature of the revisions needed and how such 
revisions can be incorporated into standard practice, in a 
way that “dissolves” the problem of patient non-adherence 
by facilitating person-centred interaction as the basis of 
clinical decision-making. 
Drawing on fascinating work on the resolution of 
scientific controversies and extensions of the concept of 
expertise, Yelovich sets out her “patient expertise 
framework,” a new epistemological framework for clinical 
interaction, within which patient expertise becomes 
“centralized as a means of determining the nature of 
patient suffering”. Yelovich is using the term “suffering” 
in a quite specific, technical sense. She explains “two 
aspects of the patient’s tacit knowledge - the body aspect 
and the meaning aspect - both of which are context-
dependent and directly accessible only to the patient.” 
These aspects of knowledge must be recognized as 
essential to the success of the interaction. The physician’s 
role “becomes that of both medical expert and possessor of 
interactional expertise, by which the physician recognizes 
and includes patient expertise in the treatment decision” 
[59]. A crucial feature of this expertise is the recognition 
and incorporation of the “negotiation of meanings” into the 
development of a treatment plan. The chapter thus presents 
what is at once a radical and eminently achievable proposal 
for the transformation of practice. 
A similarly impressive proposal regarding the nature 
and role of narrative in clinical encounters, as a means of 
supporting person-centred practice, is provided by Mary 
Walker, Wendy Rogers and Vikki Entwistle [60]. The 
authors recognise that there are numerous interpretations of 
“narrative” in healthcare, some of which are “so broad” 
that they render claims about “attending to narratives” 
trivial, while other accounts in narrative theory are “too 
narrow a concept to encompass the illness experience of all 
patients”. They also recognise that, frequently, the 
pressures facing medical professionals discussed by 
Williams, including time constraints and reasons to be 
cautious about taking patients’ statements “at face value”, 
can mitigate against the treatment of narrative as a 
significant source of knowledge in medical practice. 
To address these concerns, they analyse different 
accounts of the knowledge that narrative can contribute to 
the clinical encounter, using “insights from this 
investigation to develop a pluralist account of the 
epistemic (and related ethical) value that narrative 
approaches can add in healthcare contexts” [60]. Attending 
to narratives can assist clinicians in developing therapeutic 
relationships “that support (or at least do not undermine) 
patients’ abilities to participate actively in their 
healthcare”. Narratives provide knowledge of different 
types of connections between events and insights into “the 
meaning-making interpretive activities of individuals”. It is 
particularly instructive reading their chapter in conjunction 
with the preceding chapter by Yelovich, as the different 
types of knowledge which narratives convey clearly foster 
the interactional expertise Yelovich argues is an essential 
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skill of person-centred practice. There are also interesting 
overlaps with the chapter by Tonelli, in that the skills of 
argumentation, judgement and comparison he emphasises, 
are an essential component of the approach advocated by 
Walker et al. The authors stress that narrative, like any 
knowledge source, is not to be treated uncritically. Just as 
we recognise that randomised controlled trials “can have 
strong internal but weak external validity, and where we 
judge that this is so are cautious in applying their results to 
other populations”, so we need to make judgements about 
the reliability of particular narratives. Cultivating this skill 
is a crucial reasoning ability for any practice that requires 
an understanding of the needs of real people. 
In the chapter which follows, Marco Annoni and 
Charlotte Blease examine “shared decision-making 
(SDM)” and its relationship to person-centred care [61]. 
They note a diversity of models of SDM in the literature 
and, like Fulford [38], they do not see such diversity as 
necessarily problematic.  They argue that “clinical practice 
is too variegated and complex to be reduced to a single 
overarching theoretical ideal” and that “depending on the 
circumstances, different decision-making models may be 
appropriate” [61]. They proceed to look at five models, 
labelled respectively the “instrumental”, “paternalistic”, 
“informative”, “interpretative” and “persuasive” models. 
Analysing the underlying assumptions of each, and their 
applications in a range of contexts, the authors argue that, 
with the exception of the instrumental model, each model 
“may be appropriate depending on the circumstances”. 
The chapter discusses each model with reference to 
specific cases, arguing that decisions about the application 
of any given model to a specific case can only be made via 
an understanding of the patient, “highlighting the 
importance of structuring clinical care around actual 
persons - and their unique lives and philosophies”. This 
entails “not only an understanding of the various issues of 
fact at stake – for example, the person’s condition, her past 
clinical history, or the therapeutic regime in place - but 
also delving into her unique worldview regarding 
important issues of values and preferences.” One pertinent 
consideration of this sort is “whether she prefers a more 
active or passive role with respect to clinical value-laden 
decisions”. The authors argue that paternalism is not 
necessarily unethical and in some cases adopting a 
paternalistic model can be compatible with PCC, because 
some patients can autonomously prefer a more passive role 
in the making of complex clinical decisions. These claims, 
and the points the authors make about paternalism and 
patient competency (in particular, with reference to mental 
health), raise issues that concern authors in the final 
section of this volume. 
 
 
Psychiatry, psychotherapy and 
personhood 
 
In the twenty-fifth chapter, psychiatrist Juliette Brown 
observes that while her discipline aims to be person-
centred, it “is often not experienced as such” [62]. Taking 
up the points raised by Williams about the pressures faced 
by practitioners, Brown characterises vividly the “brutal” 
context in which medical psychiatrists have to train and 
practise, and the associated “tendency of the professions, 
organisations and systems tasked with caring for the most 
vulnerable to retreat from the painful realities we face”. 
The chapter brings out brilliantly the ways in which 
philosophically loaded conceptions of scientific rationality 
and objectivity can cause practitioners to repress or deny 
features of a broader, humanistic conception of reasoning, 
damaging themselves both as persons and practitioners, 
making it harder for them to engage with patients in the 
inclusive and beneficial ways that, as responsible 
practitioners, they aim to do. 
Brown identifies other, associated obstacles to person-
centred psychiatry, including a surprising exclusion of 
experiential expertise and failure to incorporate 
phenomenological work on mental distress in the 
knowledge base for the profession. The chapter includes 
important sections on “bearing witness to trauma” and the 
role of phenomenological accounts in informing person-
centred psychiatric practice. It makes connections with the 
concerns of many of the preceding chapters in the volume, 
linking notions of embodiment and inter-subjectivity to 
questions about the role and limits of biomedical 
approaches and the broader, social and political questions 
that preoccupied authors in the opening section. In 
particular, Brown stresses the need to recognise openly that 
“there is no proper way to practise psychiatry other than by 
making value-laden moral judgements”.  While this does 
not render psychiatry inherently unscientific [29,63] or 
indeed oppressive (as those in the anti-psychiatry 
movement might claim [63-65]) it does give rise to the 
need for a “healthy scepticism about the functions and 
frameworks in which psychiatry is practised in order to test 
them against conceptions (subject to ongoing critique) of 
the human good”. She notes the current “psychiatry 
training barely acknowledges the critical facility needed to 
engage with the moral judgements and the ethical and 
epistemic questions that rightly dominate our practise” 
[62]. Despite the obstacles, Brown sees change as 
achievable, stating that “we can view this moment as an 
opportunity, both ethical and scientific” to “scrutinise 
power inequities”, “expand our field of knowledge” and 
“train confident clinicians” who are able to wield all the 
sources of knowledge and understanding relevant to 
person-centred practice. 
Her chapter is followed by two other contributions that 
rather splendidly “join the dots” between preceding 
discussions, applying the crucial arguments about facts, 
values and the “modern world view” to areas and issues 
where they have had a particularly profound impact. While 
being rightly cautious about overly simplistic, “straw-man” 
accounts of “biomedical reductionism” found in some 
sociological critiques of biological approaches to 
psychiatry, Ketil Slagstad argues that “it still makes sense 
to trace the history of two main positions that are partly 
complementary, partly opposing” on the development of 
contemporary psychiatric epistemology, noting that by 
“looking at our past, we might better understand our 
present” [66]. After an extremely helpful exposition of the 
history of approaches to psychiatry based on genetic and 
Loughlin 
 
Editorial Introduction 
 
30 
neurobiological findings, and of contrasting contextual, 
relational approaches, Slagstad explains the influence of 
“dualist views” of human suffering on the debate, 
reinforcing dichotomies such as “nature versus culture, 
brain versus mind, somatic versus mental”. 
While there have been attempts to integrate these 
different aspects of the modern world view into theory and 
practice, perhaps most notably the “biopsychosocial” 
model, Slagsted argues that such models risk “stabilising 
rather than deconstructing” the problematic dichotomies, 
and only a more fundamental revision of the framework 
can provide the basis for progress in future. The chapter 
outlines a new approach to psychiatric epistemology that 
aspires to be “truly transdisciplinary, borrowing tools from 
history, hermeneutics, anthropology, STS-studies, feminist 
theory and phenomenology.” Only an approach such as 
this provides the possibility for an intellectually adequate 
characterisation of the relationship between “meaning” and 
“matter” that is the essential basis for a person-centred 
approach to understanding “why people get sick and what 
to do about it”. 
Focussing on psychotherapy, Henrik Berg examines the 
relationship between facts and values, and the impact of 
our assumptions about these concepts on both research and 
practice [67]. Berg begins by observing that the concept of 
the person is central to psychotherapy, but that there is 
little literature clarifying how precisely this concept is 
understood within the discipline. One of the reasons for 
this is that there is little agreement about the relationship 
between factual and evaluative understandings of 
personhood. This is particularly bizarre when one realises 
that “the typical aim of psychotherapy is to change how an 
individual patient thinks, acts and/or feels” so as to 
improve that patient’s life. As Brown argued with regard to 
psychiatry, there is no “value-neutral” way to characterise 
and operationalise this goal. Thus, Berg states, 
“psychotherapy rests upon a presupposition that some 
ways of living are superior to others.” Questions about the 
nature of value are therefore foundational to the discipline. 
The chapter cites Snow’s influential work on the 
traditional divide between the “two cultures” of “science” 
and “the humanities” in academia, supporting Snow’s view 
that “this strict division of labour” represents “a major 
obstacle for solving many of the great challenges facing 
humanity” [67]. Berg applies Snow’s analysis to the 
development of psychotherapy research and practice, 
arguing that, to overcome this obstacle, the discipline 
needs to develop a “non-modern framework ... better suited 
for capturing the kinds of values present in psychotherapy 
research and practice and to guide science and practice in a 
good manner.” This “non-modern” framework reflects 
aspects of the thinking of philosophers from Plato through 
to Mill and Husserl. While fully recognising the 
importance of gaining an improved understanding of the 
mechanisms at work in psychotherapy, Berg argues that 
the framework he proposes will enable “the researchers 
providing the research and the practitioners using the 
research” to “understand the scientific findings properly”, 
ensuring “genuine user-involvement”. He concludes that 
“the problem of values in psychotherapy is a very complex 
one”, but if we are to understand the persons whose lives 
we hope to improve, “there are no good alternatives to 
trying to develop models that encapsulate this dimension 
of psychotherapy” [67]. 
Chapter 28, our chapter, returns to debates about the 
nature of personhood and the application of the term 
“person-centred” in many healthcare contexts, including 
the context of mental healthcare. Bianca Andrade and 
Marco Azevedo focus in particular on persons with severe 
disorders of consciousness (SDC), but point out that many 
human beings - including young children and people with 
chronic or progressive conscious disorders - do not meet 
the criteria for personhood set out in many traditional 
philosophical accounts of the concept [68]. Such accounts 
frequently treat self-awareness, rationality and even a 
developed sense of moral agency as definitive of the 
concept of personhood and, as noted elsewhere [25], some 
philosophers classify people who “fall short” of this 
conception of persons as “marginal cases”. 
Since no credible contributor to this debate accepts 
what they call the “repugnant” conclusion, that such people 
should be relegated to the margins of medical concern, 
Andrade and Azevedo argue that the literature needs a 
more careful and detailed account of the meaning of 
“person-centred” than is evident thus far. In a chapter that 
is richly informed by debates in moral and legal 
philosophy, as well as arguments in the philosophy of 
mind, they set out a social conception of personhood with 
reference to community membership and the possession of 
a “personal unique biography”. In a useful discussion of 
dementia and “multiple selves”, they emphasise the need to 
assume a “second-personal stance”, to explain what it 
means to “respect the personhood” of someone no longer 
capable of participating in rational, value-laden discussions 
about her own treatment. 
Whether or not we agree with their specific account of 
personhood, the chapter is an important and powerful 
reminder of points made in the opening comments of this 
editorial introduction, regarding the need for continued 
critical reflection and clarification of the meaning of 
“person-centred”. Their account of recognising personhood 
in practice resonates with other contributions to the volume 
- references to the need for a “biographical story” 
reinforcing Tyreman’s points about meaning-giving 
narratives, and the arguments of Hamilton, Copeland, 
Sturmberg and others about the need to understand persons 
in the context of whole lives, as processes, not simply 
specific moments within those lives. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A recent editorial in the Journal of Evaluation in Clinical 
Practice concluded that: 
 
“The problems of complexity, the rise of chronic 
conditions, over-diagnosis, co- and multi-morbidity are 
serious and challenging, but we are rising to that 
challenge. Key conceptions regarding science, evidence, 
disease, clinical judgement, health and social care, are 
being revised and their relationships reconsidered: 
boundaries are indeed being redrawn; reasoning is being 
made ‘fit for practice’. Ideas like 'person-centred care' 
are no longer phrases with potential to be helpful in 
some yet-to-be-clarified way: theorists and practitioners 
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are working in collaboration to give them substantive 
import and application” [23]. 
 
The contributions to this volume are a fine illustration 
of this process. While the dialogue is by no means 
completed, and disagreements remain, these chapters 
provide us with a rich source of argument and analysis, 
both challenging our thinking and giving us the basis to 
form our own ideas about the future development of 
person-centred practice and its value for patients, 
practitioners and the broader community. 
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